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Abstract: During the First World War, Britain initiated and used the 
greatest propaganda campaign the world had ever seen. The British strategy 
was so effective that Adolf Hitler and Joseph Goebbels reportedly modeled 
the Nazi propaganda machine on the influential British prototype. The 
British propaganda during the Great War was a unique phenomenon in 
secretly using well known imaginative writers and intellectuals who wrote 
under their own names but published through commercial and university 
presses that were subsidized by the government. The writers’ involvement in 
the war effort poses a number of questions concerning their previous and 
later writing or the extent to which they were influenced by what they wrote 
during the War. Even if modernism, that was emerging at the beginning of 
the 20th century, could not be envisaged dealing with propaganda, the new 
information matrix made that possible as they were seen as two facets of the 
same coin represented by modernity. Also, focusing and analyzing further the 
writers ‘propaganda activity could bring additional insight not only into the 
literature of the First World War, but also into the broader cultural and 
intellectual environment of the war. 
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Introduction 
 
The First World War was often referred to as The Great War due to 
its worldwide implications and effects. The war was a global conflict with 
complex origins and a vast scale. Thirty-two nations were eventually 
involved in one of the major events of the twentieth geopolitical history. 
Twenty-eight of these constituted the Allied and Associated Powers, whose 
principal belligerents were the British Empire, France, Italy, Russia, Serbia, 
and the United States of America. They were opposed by the Central Powers: 
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany, and the Ottoman Empire. Although it 
was expected to end by December 1914, the war was to last for fifty-two 
moths. Its prolongation, sufferings, and universality brought about effects 
which were unpredictable when it began; the destruction not only of three 
empires, German and Austro-Hungarian and Turkish, but a total revolution 
in Russia and a significant change within the British Empire itself. 
 From the outset of the conflict it it became evident that controlling 
the information would prove an essential asset of modern warfare. The first 
offensive initiative of the British was to cut the German transatlantic cables 
in order to stop the direct communication with the neutral countries, 
particularly the United States of America.1 Furthermore, the British 
government took measures to constrict access to information at home and, on 
8 august 1914, only four days after war was declared, the Defence of the 
Realm Act (DORA) was voted by the Parliament, providing the Government 
                                                           
1 M. L. Sanders and Philip Taylor, British Propaganda during the First World War 1914-
1918, London, Macmillan, 1982, p. 19. 
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with widened powers to facilitate the war effort by all means possible. During 
the war, DORA was expanded to increased control over communication, 
including the official suppresion of dissent. What is more, opposition to the 
war was subject to censorship and could lead to the author’s imprisonment.  
 
The writers’ involvement in the British propaganda campaign during 
the First World War 
 
One of the first initiatives of the Asquith cabinet was put into action 
on 2 September, 1914, just under a month after the outbreak of war. C.F.G. 
Masterman, the former Liberal MP, was charged by Herbert Asquith with 
setting up the British propaganda campaign which was designed in response 
to the overt German campaign. Masterman thought that the German methods 
provided a lesson in how not to act, and in consequence decided that instead 
of bombing neutral countries with official propaganda from state information 
services, the British would undertake a secret campaign. 
Officially called the War Propaganda Bureau, Masterman’s gathering 
soon came to be known simply as Wellington House,  in part because the 
name would serve to hide the state’s role in Masterman’s publishing 
enterprise. Taking advantage from the great cultural prestige of British 
letters, Masterman secretly invited to his office in Wellington House twenty-
five of England’s most well-known writers. Among the invitees there were 
William Archer, J.M. Barrie, Arnold Bennet, Robert Bridges, G.K. 
Chesterton, Arthur Conan Doyle, John Galsworthy, Anthony Hope Hawkins, 
Thomas Hardy, George Travelyan, H.G. Wells, and Israel Zangwill. Rudyard 
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Kipling and Arthur Quiller Couch could not attend but sent messages offering 
their services. With the exception of Hardy, all those in attendance chose to 
help, and many others, including Ford Madox Ford and Joseph Conrad, 
joined the campaign later.2 Considering themselves as concerned citizens, the 
authors recruited into service published commissioned books under their own 
names through well-known commercial and university presses that were 
secretly subsidized by the government. The plan was so effectively secretive 
that most members of Parliament remained unaware of its operations for two 
years, and the public did not find out about the writers’ participation until the 
early 1930s.3 
 Due to these famous writers’ participation in the war effort, the 
paradigm art propaganda was put forth even though the definitions of art and 
propaganda could hardly imagine these two concepts together. While art is 
itself the final goal, propaganda is only a means to attain a specific result or 
objective, usually hidden. 
When approaching propaganda we should keep in mind that “this is 
a far more elusive concept to define”,4 partly because its recognition is often 
a function of the relative historical viewpoint of the person observing it. 
Taking this elusiveness into consideration, many investigators of propaganda 
have limited themselves to extreme situations such as war or conflicts, where 
                                                           
2 Mark Wollaeger, Modernism, Media, and Propaganda British Narrative from 1900 to 
1945, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2006, p. 14.  
3 James Duane Squires, British Propaganda at Home and in the United States, from 1914 to 
1917, London, Humphrey Milford, 1935, p. 79. 
4 A.P. Foulkes, Literature and Propaganda, London, Methuen, 1983, p. 8. 
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it is comparatively easy to identify communication intended to demoralize 
the enemy or strengthen the resolve of one’s own side.  
Such examples of initiatives intended to weaken the enemy’s morale 
were identified on both the Allied Powers and the Central Powers during the 
First World War. Related to this aspect, many episodes were registered when 
the British Army put out a series of broadsheets, conveniently just the right 
size to be slipped into an envelope being sent to the Front, containing various 
patriotic poems and prose pieces. Some of the material was written on 
demand, but much of it was taken directly from Wordsworth or Shakespeare. 
Also, leaflets were dropped over the enemy lines inciting the troops to 
mutiny, a procedure denounced as being contrary to international law. During 
the latter part of the War the paper balloon was the instrument most 
commonly used on all sides for dropping propaganda over enemy lines.5  
As it has often been stated, this kind of activities could not have been 
successful without the input of the propagandist. In fact, the defining 
characteristic of propaganda refers to the existence of the propagandist; if we 
cannot establish a link between the propagandist and his or her audience, then 
we cannot speak of propaganda.6 
           This insistence on the identifiable presence of a propagandist can be 
confusing when it confirms the common notion of propaganda as “the work 
of a few evil men, seducers of the people, cheats and authoritarian rulers who 
                                                           
5 E.H. Carr, Propaganda in International Politics, London, Oxford University Press, 1939, 
p. 11. 
6 Richard Taylor, Film Propaganda: Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, London, Barnes and 
Noble Imports, 1979, pp. 20 - 21.  
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want to dominate a population”. This view, Jacques Ellul considers, “always 
thinks of propaganda as being made voluntarily; it assumes that a man 
decides to make propaganda, which a government establishes a Propaganda 
Ministry, and that things just develop from there on. According to this view, 
the public is just an object, a passive crowd that one can manipulate, influence 
and use”.7 
           Propaganda has always existed, but modern propaganda, operating 
through techniques of saturation and multiple media channels, developed 
contemporaneously with literary modernism. Two developments made 
modern propaganda techniques possible: universal education, which led to 
the creation of the mass audience, and the development of new 
communication technologies. Ford Madox Ford, one of modernism’s most 
influential theorists, spoke for many when he complained in 1911 that the 
English were “overwhelmed every morning with a white spray of facts”8 
from the newly dominant popular press, and the negative effects of 
information overload were soon exacerbated by photojournalism and the 
wireless.  
 Understanding what propaganda meant to modernists requires us to 
see the world’s problematic status in light of its complicated history in the 
twentieth century. Specialists in propaganda studies today disagree to a great 
extent the term that some have argued that propaganda is useless as an 
                                                           
7 Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes, trans. Konrad Kellen, New 
York, Vintage Books, 1973, p. 118. 
8 Ford Madox Ford, The Critical Attitude, London, Duckworth, 1911, p. 125. 
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analytic tool and use persuasion instead, but persuasion is considered to 
cover too much ground.  
           Before World War I propagandists began to professionalize the 
manipulation of public opinion, the Orwellian connotations of names such as 
Britain’s Minister of Information (MoI) or the U.S. Committee on Public 
Information (CPI) did not exist and propaganda was typically used as 
information always had been, in a largely neutral sense. 
           Nephew to Sigmund Freud and founder of public relations as a 
profession, Edward Bernays realized the commercial potential of engineering 
public opinion while working as a propagandist for the CPI, better known as 
the Creel Commission.9 His first two books present his struggle to distinguish 
between the honorable work of public relations and its contested progenitor, 
propaganda.  
In “Crystallizing Public Opinion”, published in 1923, Bernays detects 
a connotative shift that was about to take place and admits that the average 
person probably thinks of the public relations counsel as someone who 
“produces that vaguely defined evil, propaganda”.10 In 1928 when Bernays 
published his second book on public relations, he titled it “Propaganda” and 
proclaimed that “propaganda is the executive arm of the invisible 
government”. Bernays welcomed as a fact that “in almost every act of our 
daily lives, whether in the sphere of politics or business, in our social conduct 
                                                           
9 Edward L. Bernays. Biography of an Idea: Memoirs of Public Relations Counsel Edward 
L. Bernays, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1965, p. 155. 
10 Idem, Crystallizing Public Opinion, New York, Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1923, 
pp. 11 ‐ 12. 
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or our ethical thinking, we are dominated by the relatively small number of 
persons who understand the mental processes and social patterns of the 
masses. It is they who pull wires which control the public mind, who harness 
old social forces and contrive new ways to bind and guide the world”.11 A 
more complex understanding of propaganda emerged later on in the work of 
Jacques Ellul. 
            Ellul’s importance in propaganda studies derives from his focus on 
propaganda as a sociological phenomenon made necessary by the nature of 
modern society rather than as a political weapon of a particular regime or 
organization. Ellul’s book, published in 1962, “Propaganda”, uses some of 
the ideas introduced by Bernays, and his definition of “sociological 
propaganda as the penetration of an ideology by means of its sociological 
context” echoes Bernays’s idea of the new propaganda, which “sees the 
individual not only as a cell in the social organism but as a cell organized into 
a social unit”.12 Slower and more diffuse than political propaganda, 
integration propaganda operates through political, economic, and cultural 
structures, and produces “a progressive adaptation to a certain order of things, 
a certain concept of human relations, which unconsciously molds individuals 
and makes them conform to society”.13 
  It was said that “truth has died many deaths over the twentieth 
century”, but the role played by the British propaganda campaign in World 
War I is fundamental to understanding the new media environment faced by 
                                                           
11 Idem, Propaganda, New York, Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1928, pp. 9 ‐ 10. 
12 Jacques Ellul, op.cit., p. 63. 
13 Ibidem, p. 64. 
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modernist writers and its effects on attitudes toward truth, factuality, and 
rhetoric. The plan was unique among its European counterparts in the sense 
that it emphasized facts over overt persuasion, disguised the official origin of 
its propaganda, and placed literature at the heart of its efforts. 
By the end of World War I, it was generally agreed that British 
propaganda entirely dominated the field, and most historians consider that 
the British campaign played some role in persuading the United States to 
enter the war, contributed materially to shortening the war by undermining 
German morale, and was a powerful influence on the punitive nature of the 
Treaty of Versailles.14 
           After Masterman gathered the writers, the first objective to attain in 
the order of business was to organize an “Authors’ Declaration” in support 
of the war in response to a letter that had already been published by German 
academics; the Declaration appeared in The Times both in England and the 
United States of America on September 18:  
 
The undersigned writers, comprising among them men and women of 
divergent political and social views, some of them having been for years ardent 
champions of good-will toward Germany and many extreme advocates of 
peace, nevertheless are agreed that Great Britain could not without dishonour 
have refused to take part in the present war. 
 
 Also, The “Authors' Declaration” already anticipates themes that 
would dominate official British propaganda: the altruistic duty of a united 
British Empire to protect Belgium, the militarist aggression of Prussia as 
                                                           
14 Mark Wollaeger, op. cit., p. 16. 
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distinct from the refinement of the German arts, and the war cast as a clash 
of civilisations. Related to this, extremely relevant seems H.G. Wells's 
critique of “Prussian Imperialism”:  
 
Ever since the crushing of the French in 1871 the evil thing has grown and 
cast its spreading shadow over Europe. Germany has preached a propaganda 
of ruthless force and [ ... ] materialism to the whole uneasy world. 'Blood and 
iron,' she boasted, was the cement of her unity, and almost as openly the little, 
mean, aggressive statesmen and professors who have guided her destinies to 
this present conflict have professed [ ... ] an utter disregard of any ends but 
nationally selfish ends, as though it were religion.15  
 
 Similar to those who signed the “Author s' Declaration”, H.G. Wells 
laid much of the blame for Germany's war-mongering on the “aggressive 
statesmen and professors” who had guided their nation-the Junkers who 
bolster and justify Prussian aggression. Wells did not reflect however on how 
his and his peers' own connections to the British government might have 
resembled those of the German intellectuals whom he accused. For the 
authors signing the declaration, Great Britain simply had a “destiny and a 
duty to uphold the rule of common justice between civilised people to defend 
the rights of small nations and to maintain the free and law-abiding ideals of 
Western Europe against a rule of blood and iron”. These authors' statements 
were presented as if they were independent and free from any government 
influence; however heartfelt they may have been, many of the signatories had 
already secretly agreed to volunteer for the War Propaganda Bureau program 
                                                           
15 H.G. Wells, The War That Will End War, London, Frank and Cecil Palmer, 1914, p. 11. 
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with the intention of creating materials to justify Britain's war with 
Germany.16 
After Masterman assembled his writers, and the “Authors’ 
Declaration” was released,  he moved on to consider the long-term plans 
of the propaganda campaign. Knowing that the United States was 
particularly hostile to overt appeals from its former colonial overlord, 
Masterman asked Gilbert Parker, who benefited from a well-known 
reputation as a writer and social status among the American people, to 
consult the American “Who’s Who” and compile a list of prominent and 
influential people. These people were to receive the books written under 
the auspices of the Propaganda Bureau with a note from Gilbert or the 
author, as if from one private individual to another. The same tactic was 
used with other neutral countries. Commercial publishing houses 
cooperating included Hodder and Stoughton and T. Fisher Unwin; Oxford 
University Press was also involved by publishing several volumes, most 
notably “Why We Are at War” (1914) by the Oxford historians. Arnold 
Toynbee wrote several books for Wellington House as did Lewis Namier, 
Hugh Walpole, Arthur Conan Doyle, Mrs Humphrey Ward, Hilaire Belloc, 
Gilbert Murray, and G.M. Travelyan contributed at least one each. The 
writers’ focus extended beyond English writers, Wellington House also 
solicited and translated works by foreign authors, including “Who Wanted 
War” (1915), co-authored by Émile Durkheim, and “The Trail of the 
                                                           
16 Anurag Jain, The Relationship between Ford, Kipling, Conan Doyle, Wells and British 
Propaganda of the First World War, London, University of London, 2009, p. 6. 
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Barbarians” (1917), written by Pierre Loti and translated by Ford Madox 
Ford.17 
 It is very difficult to estimate precisely the cultural influence used by 
Masterman’ s gathering of writers. “The novelists, poets, short story writers, 
critics, and dramatists at Masterman’s meeting” as Gary Messinger observes  
 
were all part of an Edwardian literary establishment that had no competition 
from radio or television and whose representatives enjoyed remarkable 
prestige throughout the world among both elite and mass audiences. Not only 
through their writings, but also through the earnings they amassed, the access 
they were given to the social networks of the politically and economically 
powerful, and the letter-writing correspondence they maintained with 
numerous loyal readers, these men were as influential a group of writers as 
the world has ever produced.18 
 
            The most positive view of British propaganda refers to the fact that it 
was primarily designed to disseminate factual accounts to counter rumors, 
gossip, incomplete stories, and fabrications already in circulation. The 
German propagandists, confident in a quick victory, resorted early in the war 
to lies or misinterpretations concerning enemy losses, territories captured or 
landmarks destroyed. In response, counterpropaganda would be effective 
simply by means of factual enumeration. As Lord Robert Cecil emphasized 
in a memo “in war – time it is the facts that count, not words. All we can do 
to help by propaganda is to let foreigners know what is actually happening”. 
Masterman too sustained the importance of delivering facts and according to 
the documents many British officials honestly believed that factual 
                                                           
17 Mark Wollaeger, op. cit., p. 16.  
18 Gary S. Messinger, British Propaganda and the State in the First World War, Manchester, 
Manchester Univ. Press, 1992, p. 35.  
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enlightenment and persuasion amounted to almost the same thing. They 
considered that facts would speak for themselves, and the world would 
recognize the truth of Allied accounts and the virtue of Allied aims. 
           The British factual emphasis developed in response to the pressures 
represented by Germany’s already established campaign. When war broke 
out on August 4, Germany had been using official propaganda bureaus, 
openly identified as such, to serve the world with its version of political 
tensions In Europe for decades. By the fall of 1914, many European neutrals 
resented the endless stream of German pamphlets. Masterman therefore 
decided to rule out direct appeals to neutral countries: “Strict secrecy has 
been observed as to any connection of the Government with the work”, he 
reported: “every recipient of material distributed gratuitously should receive 
it from an unofficial source” and the material itself would not “bear any sign 
of having been produced under the auspices of the Government”.19 
            What is more, Masterman acknowledged the power of popular 
journalism by scheduling a meeting with influential editors and journalists. 
At Masterman’s urging, representatives from the Daily Chronicle, Daily 
News, Pall Mall Gazette, Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail, British Weekly, 
“Times” and others agreed to work with the government to coordinate the 
release of official news in exchange for assurances that censorship would be 
minimal.20 Later on, David Lloyd George, who replaced H. Asquith as Prime 
Minister, recognized that he could co-opt the press even more effectively by 
appointing prominent publishers to key administrative positions. Thus Lord 
                                                           
19 Mark Wollaeger, op. cit., p. 15.  
20 Gary S. Messinger, op. cit., pp. 36 - 38.  
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Northcliffe, founder and publisher of the Daily Mail and the Daily Mirror, 
ran the Committee for Propaganda in Enemy Countries out of Crewe House, 
and Lord Beaverbrook, who held controlling interest of the Daily Express, 
ended up running the Minister of Information. 
             With an influence which covered multiple cultural domains, British 
propaganda’s commitment to empirically verifiable information contributed 
to a great extent to the increasingly equivocal status of facts. To a certain 
degree the British were true to their ideals, but their propaganda techniques 
indicate that they also knew that information flows best when “channels are 
properly greased, that factual accounts must be tailored to suit different 
audiences around the world, and that the power of facts to make an 
impression varies according to the media through which they are 
disseminated”.  
Related to this aspect it was admitted that the single most effective 
piece of propaganda disseminated during World War I, Lord Bryce’s “Report 
of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages”, published in May 1915, 
gave Germany ample grounds for its clever glossing of the Allies’ 
information services as All‐lies. Though based on dubious research, the Bryce 
Report bore all the signs of detached objectivity: depositions, extensive 
appendices, and photographs of German soldiers’ diary pages. Whereas 
Belgian committee reports refer to the “chivalrous and heroic resistance of 
the Belgian nation” against Germany’s “devastating and murderous hordes”, 
the language of the Bryce Report remains scrupulously legalistic and matter‐
of‐fact. In 1922 a Belgian commission could not substantiate any of the 
gruesome reports of children’s hands having been lopped off or of citizens 
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having been buried alive. But for the war years, Wellington House made 
mutilated Belgian children as real as actual German brutalities by translating 
the Bryce Report into thirty languages and circulating it throughout the 
world.21 
         Therefore, the report shows how factuality was becoming detached 
from empirical grounding and transformed into a form of rhetoric. At the 
time, it firmly established one of the dominant myths of World War I: 
“English civilization was fighting a war against German barbarism”. Soon 
after the German army marched into Belgium on August 4, atrocity stories 
began to appear in the press. Belgian women were said to have been raped in 
the streets, children’s hands cut off, and citizens massacred, burned, and 
buried alive. The introduction of the report insisted that all the depositions 
taken from Belgian and English soldiers were “tested” and the dubious ones 
rejected: “though taken at different places and on different dates, and by 
different lawyers from different witnesses, they often corroborate each other 
in a striking manner”. Along with the depositions, the three‐hundred‐page 
appendix includes excerpts from the diaries of German soldiers, together with 
ten photographs of sample pages. Viscount Bryce himself, recipient of 
honorary degrees from German universities and popular former ambassador 
to the United States, was convinced that German soldiers had systematically 
engaged in war crimes against the Belgian people.22 
                                                           
21 James Morgan Reid, Atrocity Propaganda, 1914‐1919, New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1941, pp. 52 ‐ 54 
22 Ibidem, pp. 203 ‐ 204. 
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          The truth, in accordance with the existing documents, is that the Bryce 
Report is filled with exaggerations, partially true statements, and probably 
some outright fabrications. The depositions corroborate one another because 
they were taken from Belgian refugees in England who had plenty of time to 
trade stories; the committee never went to Belgium and never interviewed 
anyone face to face. The diary entries in appendix, moreover, do not actually 
corroborate any of the notorious atrocities, though they do record the usual 
business of war, including looting and the execution of Belgian citizens. The 
Germans admitted that their strategy was to shorten the war by advancing 
through Belgium with extreme ruthlessness, but when a Belgian commission 
investigated in 1922, none of the terrible reports of torture or mutilation could 
be substantiated. Being advertised as an official government document, the 
Bryce Report was an aid to Wellington House’s efforts to ensure that other 
publications, such as F.M. Ford’s books, bore no trace of their state 
sponsorship; this heightened the rhetorical power of their factual grounds. 
Well‐known authors writing for Wellington House, including Arthur Conan 
Doyle, Arnold Toynbee, and Mrs. Humphrey Ward, published their books 
and pamphlets through commercial and university presses that were 
subsidized by the government through secret funds, and the publications were 
sent abroad to influential individuals accompanied by letters of 
recommendation.23 
        Another important achievement of Masterman’s gathering within 
Wellington House refers to the use of the cinematic propaganda. By the end 
                                                           
23 Mark Wollaeger, op. cit., pp. 132-133. 
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of the war, film propaganda was being shown in cinema houses and through 
Cinemotor, a mobile film unit whose large trucks gave “improvised open-air 
cinema shows” in rural areas and near the front. Cinema trade groups 
approached the War Office early in 1915 to offer their services, and though 
Masterman immediately realized film’s potential, the War Office 
Cinematograph Committee was not formed until October 1915,24 when a 
trade group, supported by Masterman, finally convinced the War Office that 
the political value of war films outweighed the estimated high costs. 
         At the beginning, cinema houses were perceived with great suspicion 
and reluctance by both the military and the government. One explanation for 
this perception would be that cinema was known as the “poor man’s theater”; 
most seats cost less than competing forms of entertainment, and as a result 
the working-class attendance was very high. During the war the attendance 
was even higher and the people spent as much on cinema as on all other forms 
of entertainment put together.25 As a response to the working-class public, 
local governments took measures to regulate cinemas by adding provisions 
to the 1909 Cinematograph Act, the first act of Parliament specifically 
concerned with the cinema, and Parliament intervened again in 1916 with 
new entertainment taxes. 
         In 1916 “Britain Prepared” became Wellington House’s first film and 
set the dominant approach to the great majority of British propaganda films 
                                                           
24 Ibidem, pp. 18-19. 
25 Nicholas Hiley, "The British Cinema Auditorium", in: Karel Dibbets and Bert Hogenkamp 
(eds.), Film and the First World War, Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 1995, p. 
162.  
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during the war. A three-hour silent film with few titles, “Britain Prepared” 
shows scenes of the British navy, munitions work, and the army in training. 
Adopting a factual approach by giving people in search of authentic war 
footage a sense of what the country was doing to win, the film was extremely 
well received by the public. As expected, the visual facts are presented from 
a British point of view managing to get “a respect, a sympathy even, for the 
men and women whose experience of war was recorded on film”.26 
 The War Propaganda Bureau produced official publications such as 
the atrocity reports, speeches for ministers, interviews and articles for the 
press, original and pre-existing books and pamphlets such as Conan Doyle's 
“To Arms!” (1914) and Ford's “When Blood is Their Argument” (1915) and 
“Between St. Dennis and St. George”. It also disseminated books for 
distribution that the WPB did not produce such as Kipling's wartime 
pamphlets. All of these materials were sent to neutral nations with the use of 
direct mailing campaIgns, steamship companIes, religious societies, and 
patriotic organisations. According to Sanders and Taylor, the War 
Propaganda Bureau also monitored the activities of independent pro-war 
organisations, reining them in when they made comments that might have 
been detrimental to the British war effort.27 
One of the authors who contributed with his writing to the war effort 
was Arthur Conan Doyle. As a famous author and the creator of the well-
known detective Sherlock Holmes, Conan Doyle knew he could also 
                                                           
26 Nicholas Reeves, Official British Film Propaganda During the First World War, London, 
C. Helm, 1986, p. 259.  
27 Sanders and Taylor, op. cit., p. 42. 
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volunteer his writings to rouse public support for the war, to encourage 
younger men to volunteer to fight, and even to appeal to the civilian German 
population who were dragged to war by the Prussian Junker elite. In a letter 
of late August 1914, Conan Doyle explained to his brother Innes that he had 
“been drawing up small leaflets which (in German) are to be scattered about 
wherever we can go to show the Germans that it is really their own tyrants, 
this damned Prussian autocracy that we are fighting”.28 His first pamphlet, 
“To Arms!”, was already written by the time he attended Masterman's War 
Propaganda Bureau authors' meeting in early September, and was published 
by the end of the same month.29 His other pamphlets included collections of 
his war journalism and articles in “The World War Conspiracy” (1914) and 
“The German War” (1914), as well as his protestations about the treatment 
of British prisoners of war in Germany in “The Story of British Prisoners” 
(1915), and his reportage of his trench visits in “A Visit to Three Fronts: 
Glimpses of the British, Italian, and French Lines” (1916). Conan Doyle also 
donated stories and poems in support of the war to charity books such as 
“Princess Mary's Gift Book” (1914) and “The Queen's Gift Book” (1915). 
Conan Doyle's “To Arms!” was published as a thirty-two-page 
penny-pamphlet on 30 September 1914. The first impression of 91,650 
copies was followed up by a further printing of 50,000.30 It was later reprinted 
under the title “The Causes of the War” in his wartime collection, “The 
                                                           
28 Jon Lellenberg, Daniel Stashower, and Charles Foley, Arthur Conan Doyle: A Life in 
Letters, London, Harper Press, 2007, p. 604. 
29 Ibidem, p. 605. 
30 Richard Lancelyn Green and John Michael Gibson, A Bibliography of Arthur Conan 
Doyle, Oxford, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1983, p. 278. 
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German War”. Conan Doyle claimed it was his duty to write about the war: 
“if there is a doubt in the mind of any man as to the justice of his country's 
quarrel, then even a writer may find work ready to his hand”.31 His work was 
aimed at addressing those people who were unsure as to why Britain was at 
war with Germany. He thus sought to establish the case for going to war and 
to persuade readers to volunteer for the fight: 
 
All our lives have been but a preparation for this supreme moment. All our 
future lives will be determined by how we bear ourselves in these few months 
to come. Shame, shame on the man who fails his country in this its hour of 
need! I would not force him to serve. I could not think that the service of such 
a man was of any avail. Let the country be served by free men, and let them 
deal with the coward or the sluggard who flinches.32 
 
Conan Doyle disapproved of forcing men to serve under government 
conscription; instead, he wished 'free men' might recognise that volunteering 
to fight was a way of defending their country and attaining honour, as well 
as of avoiding shame. The pamphlet reaffirms the twin notions of pride and 
shame in its conclusion:  
 
Have you who read this played your part to the highest? If not, do it now, or 
stand for ever shamed.33 
 
 He urged brave British men to shoulder the responsibility for 
protecting their nation - the alternative was to live with a lifetime of shame 
and never to be able to look your children in the face when asked about the 
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32 Ibidem, p. 13.  
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war. These same sentiments could be seen in the famous war poster “Daddy, 
what did YOU do in the Great War” in which a boy is playing soldiers at the 
feet of a seated man with a small girl on his knee; the girl reads a book that 
inspires her to ask her father about the war- instead of responding, his pensive 
stare is fixated on the viewer. Evoking similar notions of duty and shame in 
his pamphlet, Conan Doyle argued that while a man could die happy knowing 
he had sacrificed himself for his country, “who could bear the thoughts of 
him who lives with the memory that he had shirked his duty and failed his 
country at the moment of her need?”34 
 Conan Doyle contributed to the war effort in Britain in a variety of 
ways, including volunteering for a civilian reserve, researching a history of 
battles, issuing recruitment pamphlets, and bringing his most popular 
creation Sherlock Holmes out of retirement to fight against German spies. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 However, it is also important to admit that government propaganda 
did not completely control perceptions or actions, nor can it be blamed for all 
the beliefs and fears that people had during the war. Conan Doyle's invasion 
fears that emerged from his first Holmes story were not born from 
government discourse, for example, but instead were consistent thematically 
with much of his pre-war writing. The remarkable predominance of rumour 
during the war lends emphasis on the suggestion that propaganda does not 
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function hierarchically, from the state downwards, but instead from stories 
and legends that are dispersed through many vectors in any-given society. 
 Two decades after the Great War, Ernest Hemingway declared “that 
the last war, during the years of 1915, 1916, 1917 was the most colossal 
murderous mismanaged butchery that has ever taken place on earth and any 
writer who said otherwise lied”. Of the writers “who were established before 
the war”, he noted, “nearly all sold out to write propaganda”; and following 
the war, Hemingway argued, “their reputations steadily slumped”, because 
they “never recovered their honesty” afterwards. 
 However, as many historians and researchers of the period have 
stated, the writers involved in the war effort were true in their support for the 
war. Undoubtedly they had their internal contradictions, issues, and tensions, 
but in volunteering their efforts for British war propaganda they did not 
appear to experience an ethical imperative to question their affiliation to the 
War Propaganda Bureau. For them, it was not a crime to support the 
government decision to go to war, but rather it was perceived as an expression 
of duty. They were not lying, they were bringing arguments that they 
genuinely believed in. 
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